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This study focuses on the relationship between fund managers and appraisers in the national 
sector, of real estate investment funds, with the aim of developing a theoretical framework of how 
the independence of the appraisers is perceived by both agents. 
  Regarding the methodology, this study combines a qualitative interview survey with experts 
to understand which are the main concepts related to the appraiser´s independence and a 
quantitative survey based on a questionnaire distributed individually to several real estate fund 
managers and appraisers.  
 We can conclude that the concept of appraiser independence does not have a simple 
definition and that the factors more mentioned in the definition are the pressure, the conflicts of 
interests,   work ethic, and be qualified.  
 The qualitative research brought great added value to this study allowing us to understand 
the factors that influence the appraisers’ independence. The statistic results show that the five 
factors more correlated with the appraiser´s independence are client dimension, risk of disciplinary 
sanctions imposed by regulatory authorities or professional associations, access to the previous 
works of the same real estate, form of remuneration of the appraisals, and appraiser´s experience. 
Additionally, we also found that appraisers and other agents have the same perceptions about the 
importance of each factor to the appraisals’ independence. 
 Some limitations of this study are the lack of direct control over respondents while 
answering the questionnaire and the fact we have handled all factors the same way.  
 
 










Este estudo foca-se na relação entre gestores e avaliadores no sector nacional, de fundos de 
investimento imobiliário, com o objetivo de desenvolver um quadro teórico de como a 
independência dos avaliadores é percebida por ambos os agentes. 
 
Sobre a metodologia, o estudo combina uma pesquisa qualitativa através de entrevistas com 
especialistas para entender quais são os principais conceitos relacionados com a independência do 
avaliador e uma pesquisa quantitativa com base num questionário distribuído individualmente a 
vários gestores de fundos imobiliários e avaliadores. 
 
Podemos concluir que o conceito de independência do avaliador não tem uma definição 
simples e que os fatores mais citados na definição são a pressão, os conflitos de interesses, ter ética 
de trabalho e ser qualificado. 
 
A pesquisa qualitativa trouxe grande valor acrescentado a este estudo permitindo entender 
os fatores que influenciam a independência dos avaliadores. Os resultados estatísticos mostram que 
os cinco fatores mais correlacionados com a independência do avaliador são a dimensão do cliente, 
o risco de sanções disciplinares impostas por autoridades reguladoras ou de associações 
profissionais, o acesso a trabalhos anteriores do mesmo imóvel, forma de remuneração das 
avaliações e a experiência do avaliador. Além disso, também concluiu que os avaliadores e os 
gestores de fundos têm as mesmas perceções sobre a importância de cada fator para a 
independência das avaliações. 
 
Algumas limitações deste estudo são a falta de controlo direto sobre os inquiridos ao 
responder ao questionário e o fato dos fatores terem sido todos tratados da mesma forma.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Nowadays, with globalization and competitiveness, companies who are concerned about ethics, 
are more able to compete successfully and manage to get not only the motivation and satisfaction of 
its professionals, but also rewarding results in their businesses. Today, almost all companies have 
their own ethic code. This trend in business has become relevant to their own credibility. All the 
financial scandals that happened recently (Enron or Worlcom cases and the recent subprime 
mortgage crisis) have brought a bigger awareness towards regulation systems.  
Based on the relationship between fund managers and appraisers in the Portuguese real estate 
investment fund (hereafter referred as REIFs) industry, this paper aims to explore how appraisers´ 
independence is perceived by different agents (appraisers, fund managers or bank managers) and 
which are the factors that influence such independence. This study may contribute to the literature 
for different reasons. First, this study attempts to go further on the definition of an independent 
appraiser through an exploratory study in order to develop a scale of perceived appraisers´ 
independence (Barlett, 1993). Secondly, this work looks to determine what factors potentially 
influence these perceptions. Finally, it provides a basis for the development of a theoretical 
framework on the definition of appraisers´ independence. 
With this aim in view, we develop and propose an integrative model to assess the perceived 
appraiser’s independence. This model considers that four factors may influence the appraisers’ 
independence determination: (1) Appraiser´s characteristics; (2) Client´s Characteristics; (3) 
Appraisal´s Characteristics and (4) Environmental Context. We apply the agency theory lenses to 
analyse the specificities of corporate governance structure existent on the REIFs. Regarding the 
methodology, this study combines a qualitative interview survey with experts to understand which 
are the main concepts related to the appraiser´s independence and a quantitative survey based on a 
questionnaire distributed individually to several real estate fund managers and appraisers.  
This research shows that there are no differences between fund managers and appraisers in the 
way of how appraiser’s independence is perceived, also show that there are some factors which has 
a bigger influence to the appraisers. However, these conclusions have some limitations once the 
sample is too small and consequently the results are not so precise.  The paper is organized into five 
sections. After the introduction, we present previous relevant research on the concept of 
independence and REIFs´ corporate governance. Section 3 describes research design and 
procedures. Sections 4 and 5 discuss hypotheses and main results. Finally, in section 6 we make 
some concluding remarks and suggestions for future research. 




2. Literature Review  
2.1. Independence Concept  
 
Independence has been a subject of decades of intense empirical research and philosophical 
debate (Barlett, 1993). There are several authors with different concepts of independence. Despite 
the scarce work done about the appraisers´ independence, the concept of independence has been 
studied in other areas as for example in the accountancy literature with the auditors’ independence 
and in the corporate governance literature with studies about board independence. 
Considering that there are notable analogies between the roles of appraisers in portfolio 
appraisals and auditors in approving corporate accounts (Baum et al., 2000), and the fact that both 
professions are expected to be providers of a neutral and independent opinion about financial 
information we build on this strand of the literature in order to define the appraisers’ independence 
concept.  
Recent studies have defined independence as the auditor´s ability to resist client pressure 
(Knapp, 1985; Pany and Reckers, 1980; Pearson and Ryan, 1982) or the auditor´s ability to act with 
integrity and objectivity (McKinley et al., 1985); Pany and Reckers (1988), Moizer (1994) and 
Schuetze (1994) characterized as “an attitude/state of mind”. Camichael and Swieringa (1968) 
argued that independence is a quality of auditor professionalism which can have a range of values.  
Smolen and Casey (1997) argue that appraisers are the target of a shocking amount of client 
pressure. This pressure can place the independence of appraisers in grave doubt. Carneghi (1999) 
argued that appraisers are trained to approach an appraisal problem as neutral. Clients have not 
only incentives and the ability to influence appraisal outcomes, but appraisal process itself is 
governed to a large extent by the client and provides the opportunity for clients to exert their power 
over the valuer (Levy and Shuck, 2005). 
The definition of market value and the subjectivity of appraisals also create opportunities for 
clients to exert power over the valuer which may result in a valuer reporting a value at higher or 
lower end of the range of acceptable values (Levy and Shuck, 2005). In addition, Kinnard et al. (1997) 
discovered that some appraisers in the United States are willing to change appraisal conclusions 
under client pressure.    




RICS 1 - Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors impose requirements relative to the 
qualifications and independence of appraisers to ensure that appraisers are competent and that 
their conclusions of value are objective and free from any conflicts of interest.  
The European Group of Valuers´ Associations (TEGoVA) and the International Valuation 
Standards Committee (IVSC) are two international professional associations that dictate some 
premises that have to be guide for the appraisal. Only recently, in 2010, Portugal became a member 
of TEGoVA named Professional Association of Valuation Companies of Portugal (ASAVAL). 
In Portugal there is no single regulator to monitor appraisals. However, there are some 
associations that have been created over time, with the goal  to monitor the appraiser´s activity, 
such as APAE (Portuguese Association of Valuers of Engineering) and ANAI (National Association of 
Real Estate Appraisers), but they are just merely interest groups. The CMVM2 is the only organization 
which requires that certain rules are followed, but there is not an organization as there is the RICS in 
England. 
The RICS, within the scope of self-regulation that has developed over the years, has a number of 
professional codes of practice for its members. Some of them are universal and mandatory (such as 
the Red Book), some are also mandatory but to a geographical area and specific area of practice (as 
might be the Residential Estate Agency Code of Practice, that is mandatory in United Kingdom).  
The Red Book is the only statement Practice mandatory for all members all over in the world. 
The aim of these documents is to provide more information about the standards or technical issues 
in specific aspects of assessment. 
 
2.2. Portuguese Real Estate Investment Funds (REIF´s) 
Risk is a concept shared by almost all companies, therefore to achieve the succeed and stay in 
the market, it is essential to devise strategies to maximize revenues and minimize costs, thus 
                                                             
1
 RICS is the world's leading professional body for qualifications and standards in land, property and 
construction. As people, governments, banks and commercial organizations continue to demand more 
assurance of certified standards and ethics, attaining RICS status is the recognized mark of property 
professionalism (source: www.rics.org). 
2 The Committee on Securities Market (CMVM) aims to oversee and regulate the securities markets and 
financial derivatives and activity of all agents that act on them. The CMVM is an independent public body with 
administrative and financial autonomy. 
 




promoting sustainable growth through investments that provide favorable returns. One way to 
reduce  risk could be by sharing it with third parties, and at that point there are currently several 
options that the economy allow to do, such as Real Estate Investment Funds. 
REIFs were first introduced in Portugal in 1987. In simple terms, investment funds are 
independent assets resulting from the aggregation and application of individual and collective 
entities savings in securities or equivalent. In other words, they represent an alternative to the usual 
financial product forms application of investors' savings, including bank deposits and direct 
investment in the capital market. 
The access to professional management, the diversification of benefits, the attractive long-term 
capital appreciation and the low return volatility are the main advantages associate with this type of 













The structure and operations of these funds are governed by Portuguese legislation and 
Portuguese securities market regulation3, being subject of extensive requirements of public 
disclosure.  
The real estate investment funds applications must be accompanied and managed by 
specialized professionals in the capital market and real estate denominated real estate 
investment funds management companies, in return for a management fee (payable by the 
Fund). These entities have the sole purpose of managing, on behalf of the participants, one or 
                                                             
3
  See Decree-Law nr. 13/2005 dated January, 7
th
 and CMVM´s regulation nr. 8/2002.  
 
Fig. 1: Real Estate Investment Funds Process 
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more real estate investment funds. In addition to the management company, there are other 
entities involved in this process: the Custodian and Marketing Entities4. 
The real estate investment fund may take one of the following three ways: Open Funds, 
Closed Funds and Mixed Funds. Open Funds are composed by fund units variable in number, that 
means, the number of units varies depending on market demand, so that a subscription results in 
an increase in fund units and a redemption results in a elimination of fund unit´s match. The 
Closed Funds consist of a fixed number of units, established at the time of issue, and may 
eventually be increased to pre-define in the regulation of fund management. In this case, the 
investment or disinvestment in a Closed Fund is through the purchase or sale of units. Finally, the 
Mixed Funds consist of two categories of fund units, with a fixed number and a variable number. 
The custodian (which is generally a bank) receives on deposit the assets of the fund and 
satisfy requests for subscription and redemption of units, which are securities representing the 
investment. Meanwhile, the Marketing Entities, which may be more than one, are in charge of 
the task of marketing the fund units to the public investor. For the fund units, they are all 
identical, and give the participant the right of ownership over part of the assets of the fund, 
which corresponds to the value of fund unit that each hold.  
Both entities have to act in an independent way in the exclusive interest of fund participant. 
Either the custodian or the management company are usually exercised by a commercial bank 
that distributes fund units through its retailing branch networking. The management company is 
frequently owned by this bank group which could have implication for agency relationship in the 
whole process (agency problems will be discussed later).  
Properties should be valued before any acquisition or disposal and with a minimum 
periodicity of two years by two independent appraisers. Meanwhile, in order to determine the 
value of the fund net asset value subscription or redemptions, fund managers may choose any 
value between the acquisition cost and the average of appraisal values attributed by two 
independent appraisers.  
CMVM has recently issued a statement with proposals for changes to real estate appraisals5: 
                                                             
4 According to Portuguese legislation, the functions of the management company and the custodian should be 








 The value of the property comprising the assets of these funds will be calculated solely 
based on the average of the assessment by at least two expert appraisers. 
 Real estate owned by public subscription funds should be evaluated every six months by 
experts and in other cases annually. 
 The proposed amendments seek to bring the value of real estate funds to the amount that 
could be obtained under normal market conditions, if the property is sold in the moment of 
the appraisal. The projects submitted for public consultation also provide that the activity of 
experts becomes subject to simplified registration in the CMVM rather than mere notice. 
 Experts now have to adopt written policies and procedures governing in particular their 
standards of ethics, independence, professional qualifications and internal organization, the 
terms in which they can perform operations on personal property or financial instruments 
affected by its activity and its policy on confidentiality, conflicts of interest, with regard to 
remuneration should not depend on the value of units of the fund or of the appraised value 
of the property. 
Experts who can no longer evaluate more than 20% of the property portfolio of funds with 
more than three properties and the value of receipts of each fund manager, the expert shall not 
exceed 20% of their annual turnover. 
 
2.3. Corporate Governance 
The corporate governance topic has special relevance in the following of major international 
financial scandals, so the main development is associated with the need to combat fraud and 
facilitate companies' access to capital markets, in view of the principles of transparency, fairness and 
social responsibility.  
Uncertainty and information asymmetry problems pose conflicts of interest in the relationships 
within the organizational structure that affect the basic functions of organizations and their potential 
for value creation. The theory further developed and from which most of the models and processes 
of corporate governance has been adopted, is the agency theory, which includes the separation of 
ownership and management company (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 Agency Theory refers to a set of propositions in governing a firm which is typically characterized 
by a large number of shareholders or owners who allow separate individuals to control and direct 




the use of their collective capital for future gains. The theory offers many useful ways to examine the 
relationship between owners and managers and verify how the final goal of maximizing the returns 
to the owners is achieved, particularly when the managers do not own the corporation’s resources. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) mention the important role of monitoring in an agency relationship, 
they do not examine further how a large firm achieves efficient monitoring, i.e. how do firms 
structure their corporate governance in order to control the agency problem created by the 
separation of ownership and control? There are several authors that characterize Agency Theory 
under different theses, Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Ross (1973) refer that Agency Theory occurs 
when cooperating parties have different goals and division of labor.  Agency theory is concerned 
with resolving two problems that can occur in agency relationships. The first is the agency problem 
that arises when (a) the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or 
expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing (Eisenhardt, 1989). The issue 
with this is that the principal cannot verify that the agent has behaved appropriately. The second is 
the problem of risk sharing that arises when the principal and agent have different attitudes toward 
risk. The main concern related to this is that the principal and the agent may prefer different actions 
because of the different risk preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989). Jensen and Meckling (1976) assume 
that as agents do not own the corporation’s resources, they may commit “moral hazards” (such as 
shirking duties to enjoy leisure and hiding inefficiency to avoid loss of rewards) merely to enhance 
their own personal wealth at the cost of their principals (Agency costs). 
The guarantee of appraisers´ independence is very important to assure the investors’ confidence 
on the appraisal values, once investors in real estate investment funds buy and sell fund units on the 
basis of the fund´s net asset value and the number of units issued. As the fund asset is mostly 
composed by properties that are appraised periodically by independent appraisers, the accuracy of 
real estate investment funds appraisals is fundamental to investment decision and performance 
measure. 
 
Next figure represent the relationship between participants in the appraisal process applied to 























Agency problems between Investors and Fund Managers 
In the context of real estate investment funds, the conflict exists between investors and fund 
managers, where the fund managers have the responsibility to make sure that the interests of 
management companies’ shareholders are aligned with those of fund owners. Cieleback (2004) 
argues that the problems associated with principal agent relationships are of great importance for 
investors. 
 Who hire the fund managers are the fund management companies board to manage different 
funds with various investment objectives. Each fund is a pool constituted by investor contributions 
separated from the others funds and investment company´s own assets. The management 
companies´ shareholders are different from investors who hold fund units. 
The management fee and custodian fee are supported directly by the real estate fund and 
represent income to the management company and custodian entity respectively. These fees are 
usually based on appraised values of properties under management and therefore may constitute an 
incentive for real estate investment funds management to maximize appraisal of their fund´s 
properties and the associated management fees, while fund investors desire high returns at low 




















Figure 2: Appraisal process in Real Estate Invest Funds 
Source: adapted from Levy and Schuk (1999) 




The management company and the custodian must act independently, being jointly responsible 
for providing fund participants with a guarantee of compliance with all legal duties and management 
regulation6. On the other hand, the legal framework imposes limits on management companies 
operations in order to avoid conflict of interests. For example, the acquisition from and disposal of 
properties to management company, custodian or to individual that directly or indirectly hold a 
participation in the management is subject to Portuguese Security Exchange Commission (CMVM) 
approval. 
Agency problems between Managers and Appraisers 
 The relationship between fund managers and appraisers could also lead to potential conflicts 
considering the incentives of parties involved in the process and the existing asymmetry of 
information. The appraisal value is a service provided by an agent (appraiser) to a principal (fund 
manager) who in turn is acting as an agent on behalf of fund participants.  
Fund managers hire independent appraisers to conduct the appraisals of properties under 
management. Therefore, the investment decision and the fee received periodically by the 
management company are a function of these appraisals. Consequently, there is an incentive for 
REIF´s managers to try to maximize appraisal of the fund´s properties under management. This 
incentive is even stronger if we take into account that it is the fund manager that provides the 
appraisers with much of the information used in individual REIFs properties and if we consider that 
the manager is able at any time to dismiss the appraiser and require an alternative opinion in the 
case of not agreeing with the assessment made by the appraiser. 
External factors can cause conflict of interests, as the influence of the client once the appraiser 
do not want to lose the commercial relationship in order to receive the fee. Sometimes, higher fees 
are offered, or offers are made of continuation of future engagement. At other times, professional 
fees are denied (Kohli, 1989) as the reward and coercive power of clients. Moreover, clients at times 
offer prejudiced appraisal information to their appraisers particularly in markets unfamiliar to the 
appraisers (Levy and Schuck, 1998). 
Economic circumstances may also influence the motivations of the parties involved in the 
process (Dalbor, 2001). Stakeholders in the process may want appraised values to be higher or lower 
depending on the circumstances. Nowadays with the crisis that we are living, it is expectable that 
                                                             
6
 As per article 14º e 15º of Decree-Law nr. 13/2005 dated January, 7
th
. 




fund managers use from their potential influence on appraisers to limit the downward trend of real 
estate prices.  
The Portuguese legislation and Securities Market Commission regulation impose different rules 
to inhibit parties involved from attempting to influence the appraisal process7. The properties held 
by REIFs must be appraised by at least two independent real estate appraisers. Real estate appraisals 
should be conducted in an objective and rigorous way in order to provide the best price which could 
be obtained if the property were sold at the moment of appraisal, under normal conditions. 
Appraisers should be certified by a grade course organized by entities that duly authorized by the 
CMVM. Different conflicts of interests are considered in CMVM regulations the action of real estate 
appraisers8.      
The creation of institutions limiting possible agency problems from within the real estate markets is 
a way to reduce the agency problems (Cieleback, 2004). Contrary to what happens in certain 
countries, Portugal does not have a strong and organized structure to monitor the appraisal 
procedures. However, there are some monitoring procedures required, as for example t he reports 
and accounts are subject to a report drawn up by an auditor registered with CMVM which also 
contribute to the reliability and confidence on appraisal values.  
 
3. Research Design  
As the topic of appraiser´s independence is at an early stage of research and studies in this area 
are scarce, we perform an exploratory study based on a mixed method approach (Mingers, 2001). A 
sequential research design was developed in which the results of a qualitative study would feed a 
subsequent quantitative study. The combination of multiple methods in research strengthens its 
meaning, discussion and conclusions (Mingers, 2001). We first began by getting qualitative data 
through in depth-interviews in order to understand which are the main factors that are considered 
relevant for the definition of appraisers´ independence. In order to achieve our aim this qualitative 
approach was taken, allowing a focus on the search for meaning and understanding (Goulding, 
                                                             
7
 Decree-Law nr. 13/2005 dated January, 7
th
 and CMVM´s Regulation nr. 8/2002 
 
8 Article 21th of CMVM´s Regulation nr. 8/2002 establishes some incompatibilities like the individuals that have 
worked or have a group or controlling relationship with the management company cannot be designated as 
real estate appraisers of REIFs. In addition, units-holders which have more than 0,5% of the investment units 
of the funds to which the real estate relates and legal persons which simultaneously provide consultancy and 
real estate intermediary services in relation to the real estate property to be valued may not be designated as 
appraiser. 




1998). The approach is also based on a preconception that detailed knowledge of the research 
questions is situated with professionals and could be best accessed by personal interview or “close 
dialogue” (Clark, 1998). Secondly, the findings of this qualitative study allowed us to develop a 
questionnaire. This questionnaire was then applied to the various agents of the industry to get the 
quantitative data. We selected two main samples for the survey: real estate fund managers and 
appraisers of the Portuguese REIF´s due to their direct or indirect involvement in the production of 
appraisals estimates. Additionally, the survey was also sent to banks’ mortgage credit managers.  
As said, to test the factors presented we used the survey method. Surveys are often used in 
real estate behavioral research as it is considered an effective way of inference about people´s 
attitudes (Beattie et al., 1999). This survey is based on a set of interviews with appraisers, regulators 
and managers of real estate investment funds. The main objective of these interviews is to 
understand the point of view of the main agents and to identify recurring themes and other relevant 
information about the factors that are perceived as critical to ensuring the independence of 
appraisers. An interview protocol (Appendix A) was developed based on the existent literature about 
appraisals and auditors independence taking into account Yin’s (2003) recommendations, in order to 
ensure that the data collection was adequate to accomplish the study objectives. The interviews 
were recorded and transcribed in order to be carefully analyzed. A total of five face-to-face semi-
structured interviews were made with appraisers, regulators and fund managers in order to 
understand the different perspectives. The interviews were conducted in Portuguese and each last 
around one hour. 
The interview protocol included four groups of factors perceived appraisers´ independence: (1) 
factors related to the characteristics of the appraiser (2) factors related to the characteristics of the 
client (3) factors related to the characteristics of appraisals and (4) factors related with the context 
in which appraisals are conducted. 
(1) About the factors related to the characteristics of the appraiser, we focus on the size of the 
company (if it is an international Big-N or not), the previous experience and the economic 
dependence of a specific client.  
 
(2) Concerning the factors related to the characteristics of the client, we asked about the type 
of client (banks, funds or firm), and the size of the client (including the economic and 
financial situation of the client). In addition, we tried to explore an important concept, 
already discussed in the literature review, which is the conflict of interests. To understand 
the implications behind this concept, we mentioned the importance of the appraisal to the 




appraiser, the dependence of the remuneration on appraisal values, and if it exists some 
meeting with the client before the appraisal report be finished.   
 
(3) As far as the factors related to the characteristics of the appraisal are concerned, we 
centered in the goal of the appraisal, namely if the appraiser is influenced by the fact of 
knowing if the appraisal has as purpose the sale or the purchase of the property and the 
impact of previous works.  
 
(4) Regarding the factors related to the context, we focused on the role of professional 
associations in this market, the existence of a regulator to ensure the independence of the 
appraiser and if there is some kind of sanction in case of ethical principles being violated.  
Another relevant question is about the market conditions, if the great competition 
/competitiveness influence the appraiser’s independence. 
 
4. Results 
There are risks inherent to qualitative, interview-based, research methodologies which can lead 
to doubts about the rigor of the process and the validity of the results and conclusions (Baum et al., 
2003). Additionally, criticisms have been raised concerning the lack of methodological rigor and 
transparency of qualitative research in social geography in terms of the lack of explicit consideration 
of methodological issues in conducting the research and analyzing the data (Baxter and Eyles, 1997). 
Although there are some concerns about the validity and generalizability of qualitative data, recent 
research has argued that the combination of different research methods can increase the 
understanding of the phenomenon under study and could lead to the development of better 
theories (Ventakesh et al., 2012). Particularly, in the present study, one of the objectives is to better 
understand a complex concept, the appraisals independence. A qualitative study followed by a 
quantitative one has been identified as an adequate research design approach (Ventakesh et al., 
2012). On the other hand, some procedures have been taken in order to increase the objectivity of 
data collection and the validity of results. For example, the same interview protocol was applied in 
all interviews; more than one research was present, allowing the triangulation of researchers; all 
interviews were recorded and transcribed and then codded by more than one researcher.    
 
 




4.1. Qualitative Data 
With the interviews, we have validated the appropriateness of the factors that were found in 
the literature review and gathered new factors influencing the appraisals independence, integrated 
into the groups mentioned in the research design section. We interviewed three fund managers and 
three appraisers. The interviews lasted an average of one hour. Three of the five interviewers 
permitted that the interview was taped and transcribed. The interviewees were asked permission 
for the use of data and as a guarantee of confidentiality their names were omitted. For each of the 
interviewees was assigned a code according to the chronological order of the interviews. Appendix B 
presents a brief characterization of the interviewees. 
 
Characteristics of the appraiser 
Both appraisers and fund managers defended that more experience means more resistant to 
clients´ pressure as experienced appraisers have more arguments and know-how of the market. So 
age and experience are factors in favor of a greater resistance to pressure the client. “I think the 
experience is a factor in the competence of the appraiser. As more experience, more competent. Who 
has more experience doesn´t like to be known as who makes favors, because it takes away some 
credibility.” argued the interviewee D. Regarding the pressure in young appraisers “depends on the 
character and educational background of the person” said interviewee A. 
From the perspective of a fund manager, appraisal companies are always further away from the 
notion of market than an appraisal company that also makes mediation of real estate. This is 
because a company that also makes mediation has the two views, in other words does transactions 
and talks with investors. An independent appraisal company, without much notion of market 
assessing, can always evaluate according to some methods of cost, but need to know the value of 
the land, so it is very important to know what is the market value and a simple appraiser is always 
away. "Separating the appraisal of advisory / mediation makes sense in some aspects but in other 
aspects it makes no sense. Because who has the know-how of the market, how the market is 
behaving at all times and not having a market as our, which is small, there is no evidences, there are 
very few transactions." (Interviewee C). In the other hand, from the perspective of an appraiser, 








Characteristics of the client 
The background we got was that the economic and financial independence is essential for 
independence in the appraisals and is equally important that the remuneration is correct, 
appropriate and fair to the work of the appraiser. “To have independence there must be capacity to 
generate its own revenues and the company must have an object and be profitable. Assuming that is 
not subordinated to other activities namely the real estate mediating being a poor relation.” 
(Interviewee B) 
Incentives to influence appraisal results may exist when the client’s remuneration is 
performance based or when appraisals are used for purposes such as rent reviews and borrowing or 
when they are required to validate in-house appraisals (Levy and Shuck, 2005). There are two ways 
for the remuneration of appraisers: In real estate investment funds is in levels, which means that 
depends on the appraisals values, therefore, it may happen that the appraisers do not care to 
evaluate a little bit higher to get more fees. In banks, it is tabulated in terms of the mortgage. In 
some companies the criteria depends on the appraisal complexity. In the present time, with our 
national financial situation, the appraisal price is much more competitive, says interviewee C that “It 
feels a big competition from small independent companies, which sometimes makes us do the most 
competitive prices.”  
Nowadays the management companies ask more often to review the report previously before 
the final appraisal, so that the evaluator can substantiate and justify the value determined. This 
procedure can in some way influence the appraiser independence, because is a good opportunity for 
clients to make pressure in order to get a better appraisal. Client influence has great potential to 
affect appraisals (Levy and Shuck, 2005). 
 
Characteristics of the appraisal 
From the interviews with the appraisers and fund managements, either goal appraisal or 
previous works may influence the appraisal, although there are situations that will always depend on 
the appraiser character. Interviewee C explained how the appraiser can feels “There is always an 
influence and there are always situations of great conflict when the appraiser has a value and is 
creating problems to the customer. The customer may dislike the appraiser and doesn´t contact him 
anymore. There's always that danger, but there is another side of the coin, which is creasing 
seriousness and credibility (..)”. 
After the conversation with  interviewee E, the conclusion was that the market in Portugal is 
very small, so all the fund managers know the appraisers companies and that fact can be a factor of 




influence. This means that fund managers can choose the appraiser according the appraisal and 
create pressure on appraisers.    
Factors related to the context 
Regarding the fact that there is no organization that regulates the activity of appraisers, the 
interviewers admitted that the existence of an entity will be necessary to give more credibility to 
appraiser´s work. Such a body is even more needed in a time of crisis in which the pressures are 
even more by the customers. We found that the smaller appraisal firms are more demanded by 
practicing lower prices and have greater vulnerability to suffer from the pressures of client. 
All the interviewees were asked about their notion of the concept appraiser’s independence and 
other factors besides the ones who were mentioned above have emerged. As specific training in 
investment funds; be independent of management companies; there is no conflict of interest 
between who is evaluating and who is selling or buying a property; only have a big client portfolio; 
small appraisers may have much more dependent on specific customer, the least known become 
more permeable to be influenced and pressured to keep certain values. 
The next figure shows in a simple way all the factors that were perceived to be crucial to 
appraisers’ independence. 
 
Figure 3.  Model of factors affecting appraiser’s independence 
Source: Adapted from Levy  and Schuk (1999) 




4.2. Quantitative Data 
A five-point Likert-type scale was used, with the range one (no important) to five (very 
important). The survey was administered to fund managers and appraisers of Portugal. With a 
sample of 75 responses (in a universe of almost 300 professional) the data analysis was divided in 
two phases.  
Some basic statistical analysis was made with the 75 answers, so 35% were appraisers, 19% 
were fund managers. 17% works in appraisal at least five years, 35% works in appraisal at five to 
fifteen years and 24% works for more than fifteen years.  42% were graduates, 24% were masters 
and 5% were PhD. 23% works in international firms and 53% in national firms.  
Phase 1 
To analyze the quantitative data, it was used an exploratory factor analysis for a set of items to 
identify the simplest factor structure and the most interpretable solution. Factor analysis assumes 
that relationships between variables are due to the effects of underlying factors and that observed 
correlations are the result of variables sharing common factors. For this, we used the SPSS program 
and the Varimax method of orthogonal rotation. The output gives us two measures, the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin and Bartlett´s test of sphericity. The KMO measure of sampling adequacy tests whether 
the partial correlations among variables are small. Kaiser (1954) recommends accepting values 
greater than 0.5 as acceptable, the values between 0.5 and 0.7 are mediocre, and values between 
0.7 and 0.8 are good, values between 0.8 and 0.9 are great and values above are superb. Bartlett's 
test of sphericity tests whether the correlation matrix is an identity matrix, which would indicate 
that the factor model is inappropriate. The research involved generating and categorizing questions 
and gathering and analyzing data to eliminate items.  A total of 23 items were generated to measure 
the factors.  
Complementarily, the Cronbach's Alpha (α) was calculated in order to measure the internal 
consistency ("reliability"). In the output the values in the column labeled Corrected Item-Total 
Correlation shows the correlation between each item and the total score from the survey. In a 
reliable scale all items should correlate with the total, so if any of the values are less than 0.3 the 
items do not correlate with the overall score. The column Cronbach´s Alpha if Item is Deleted shows 
the values of the overall α if item is not included in the calculation. When any item is deleted 
indicate that none of the items would increase the reliability if they were deleted. 
  





Another approach was made in order to understand the differences between the answers of 
the fund managers and the appraisers, i.e. perceiving the two perspectives of the appraisal. For this 
research was used the Mann-Whitney U Test. This non-parametric test works looking at differences 
in the ranked positions of scores in different groups.    
 
4.2.1. Data Analysis 
 
Phase 1 
Data were analyzed with several objectives in mind: purification, unidimensionality, reliability, 
brevity and simplicity of factor structure (Dhillon et al., 2002). Churchill (1979) describes the need to 
purify the items (i.e., eliminate “garbage items”). He suggests that when the factor analysis is 
conducted before purification, it produces many more dimensions than can be conceptually 
identified, confounding the interpretation of the factor analysis.   
 The purification procedure, allowed us to eliminate 3 of 25 items. Reliability analysis resulted 
in elimination of one more item. The value obtained in the KMO measure was 0.787, which shows a 
mediocre fit of possibilities for data processing with the factor analysis method (Appendix C). 
Data analysis revealed that respondents had difficulty relating the items frequent rotation of 
the appraiser, academic training of the appraiser and client type (bank, investment fund or firm) 
with the independence of the appraiser. Bartlett's test significance result is less than 0.0001, which 
allows again to confirm the ability and suitability of factorial analysis method for processing data, in 
other words, this suggests that the intercorrelation matrix contains enough common variance to 
make factor analysis worth pursuing (Dhillon et al., 2002).  
The factor structure was not easy to interpret given the heterogeneity of the items 
presented in each factor request. However, five factors were achieved, External pressures: the 
customer and the competition (eight items); Appraiser´s risk (four items); Client/appraiser 
relationship (four items); Conflicts of interest (three items); Appraiser and appraisal characteristics 
(three items). The range for factor loadings was 0.49 to 0.84 for external pressures: the customer 
and the competition, 0.56 to 0.87 for Appraiser´s risk, 0.49 to 0.8 for Client/appraiser relationship, 
0.46 to 0.71 for Conflicts of interest, and 0.58 to 0.8 for Appraiser and appraisal characteristics.  




Using this data set Cronbach´s αs for the five-factor model were calculated, as you can see in 
Table 1. The factor I (external pressures: the customer and the competition) and the factor II 
(appraiser´s risk) presents an overall reliability higher than 0.8 (0.86 and 0.82, respectively) which 
indicates a high level of internal consistency for our scale with this specific sample.  The remaining 
factors indicate an overall reliability lower than 0.7 and the values in the Cronbach´s Alpha if Item is 
Deleted indicated that none of the items here would increase the reliability if they were deleted 
because all values in this column are less than the overall reliability. Another way to see if delete an 
item could improve the overall reliability was by the Corrected Item-Total Correlation if it was less 
than 0.3.  
Regarding the eigenvalues, the corresponding values to the factor have a little importance 
for the explanation of the variance. The variance of the factor I is very high, which means that the 










Table 1 -  Factor Analysis and Cronbach α. 
  





The output of Mann-Whitney test indicates the factors perceived by the two groups 
(appraisers or fund managers) as the ones who have more influence in the appraiser’s 
independence.  Analyzing the output, it is possible to conclude that there are no differences 
between appraisers and other agents (such as fund managers) about the way independence 
appraiser´s perceived. The p-value associated with each statistical test on each item was insignificant 
( ρ > 0,0001) (see Appendix D). 
 
The ranks mean indicate us the items that affect  positively and negatively the appraiser´s 
independence (Appendix E). 
 
Items which affect positively (from most important to least important): 
 An appraisal carried out by a company integrated in an international group of appraisal has 
better conditions to be perceived as more independent. 
 The appraisal of a company known in the market is more credible than the appraisal 
of a company little-known.  
 The mandatory change of the appraiser contributes to a greater independence in appraisals. 
 The existence of sanctions for appraisers can ensure increased independence of appraisals. 
 The existence of standards and internal guidelines contribute to increase the independence 
of the appraiser. 
 
 
Items which affect negatively (from most important to least important): 
 The appraisers of small firms are more influenced to any pressure from customers. 
 The existence of a prior relationship between the appraiser and the client contributes to a 
lesser independence of the appraisers. 
 A big client can put more pressure on the appraisers, which can compromise their 
independence. 
 The existence of meetings between the client and the appraiser before the final report may 
contribute to greater pressure by the client to the appraiser. 
 Currently there is a big competition price in the appraisals which may contribute to decrease 
the independence of appraisals. 






It is noticeable the need to develop this theme in Portuguese real estate market. Of course that 
there are opposing opinions between those who assess and mediate, in particular about the 
definition of appraiser´s independence, however with regard to the range of factors that influence 
the appraiser´s independence opinions do not differ much. 
The qualitative research of the factors was essential for the development of this study, however 
the number of interviews may have been insufficient to understand the real perspective of who 
evaluates and who mediates. 
The survey was based in factors that were perceived to be crucial to appraisers’ independence 
(adapted from Levy and Schuk, 1999), which was firstly tested by some experienced appraisers. 
However, after we get the survey´s results we understood that was some misunderstandings for 
some interviewees about the meaning of the question and the degree of importance of the factor 
involved. As an example: “The size of the client should not have any importance in appraisal work, 
i.e. two building side by side, one of a family office another giant of a publicly quoted, in my opinion 
both should have the same criteria and valuation assumptions”. 
Real Estate Appraisal students also answer the survey, the lack of experience in the market may 
have negatively influenced the way they understand the factors that influence the appraiser´s 
independence. 
About the quantitative research we get two different results. The factorial analysis indicate us 
that the items which more affect the appraiser´s independence are client dimension; risk of 
disciplinary sanctions imposed by regulatory authorities or professional associations; access to the 
previous works of the same real estate; form of remuneration of the appraisals; and appraiser´s 
experience. Whereas the Mann-Whitney Test indicate us that the most important items are the 
appraisers firms dimension; the existence of a prior relationship between the appraiser and the 
client; client dimension; the existence of meetings between the client and the appraiser before the 
final report and the big competition price in the appraisals. So with two different groups of questions 









6. Conclusion and Limitations 
 
The first conclusion that we can take from this study, after all the interviews and the surveys 
that were done, is that the concept of appraiser independence do not have a simple definition and 
that the factors more mentioned in the definition are the pressure, the conflicts of interests, work 
ethic, and be qualified.  
 
This research proposes a new set of factors that are important in the context of the appraisal’s 
independence which has implications both to managers and to researchers. In fact, most of the 
respondents of the survey that leave an overall comment about the study, expressed the timely 
relevance and usefulness of this research.  
 
The combination of multiple research methods in this work strengthens the meaning and the 
understanding of a complex reality, as it is the case of the appraisal’s independence. The qualitative 
research brought great added value for this study allowing us to understand the factors that 
influence the appraisers’ independence. The statistics results show that the five factors more 
correlated with the appraiser´s independence are client dimension, risk of disciplinary sanctions 
imposed by regulatory authorities or professional associations, access to the previous works of the 
same real estate, form of remuneration of the appraisals, and appraiser´s experience. Additionally, 
we also found that appraisals and other agents have the same perceptions about the importance of 
each factor to the appraisals’ independence. 
 
Both in the interviews phase and in the survey phase, participants have expressed that it would 
be very important that in the future a single body regulate the activity of real estate appraisal. While 
this does not happen a solution to minimize the pressure from the client is exactly not knowing the 
client.  
 
We believe that we contributed to the enhancement of the existing literature, although the 
quantitative data this study has some limitations, in particular given the small sample size taking into 
account the number of factors we have. It is possible to justify that reality with the small market that 
we have in Portugal in this area. Nevertheless is a weakness when we interpret the results. 
Additionally, the respondents are only from Portugal, which is a concern in terms of generalizability. 
Another limitation is the fact that data was collected through self-completion questionnaires. 




Therefore, there is a limitation of self-report biases of respondents, in particular the meaning of 
some of the questions due the technical terms that in some cases it was not possible to overcome.  
 
In addition, there was a lack of direct control over respondents while answering the 
questionnaire. The survey was distributed via e-mail to potential respondents. By clicking on the link 
provided on the email, respondents were directed to the survey website. Once the respondents 
accessed the website, it was up to them to complete the survey at their own pace. It would be 
beneficial to administer the survey in a controlled environment where they could be directly 
monitored and any doubts could be immediately clarified. 
7. Further Research 
 
For future studies maybe it was important to distinguish better between intrinsic appraiser´s 
independence factors (most within the field of ethics and the profession by experience and 
academic background) and extrinsic appraiser´s independence factors (companies, customers, 
banks, associations, etc.. which by its size and dominant position in the sector make use of their 
ability to pressure). The fact we have handled all factors the same way can justify that the results 
were not so precise.  
 
Another recommendation is that the study should reflect on the current "circuit" of appraisals: - 
Who hires appraisal services? To what end? - Who makes them and under what conditions?  
For reflection - would be synonymous with the existence of independence "of central reviews" run 
by the supervisory entity? 
 
Also, in future studies about appraiser’s independence we could widen the study to other 
European countries. This would allow one to get a better understanding about the weight of the 
regulatory context in the independence’s perception. In fact, expanding the study to the 
international markets, not only to get a bigger range of responses to make the results more precise 
but also to understand the differences between how this subject is approached in Portugal and the 
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1. Qual seria a sua definição de “avaliador independente”? 
2. Nas questões que se seguem, indique o seu grau de concordância: 
 Um avaliador com mais anos de experiência profissional na área consegue resistir 
melhor a eventuais pressões 
 Um avaliador mais jovem consegue ser mais independente 
 A avaliação realizada por uma empresa integrada num grupo internacional de 
avaliação tem melhores condições para ser percebida como mais independente 
 A avaliação realizada por uma empresa nacional de avaliação tem melhores 
condições para ser percebida como mais independente 
 A avaliação realizada por um avaliador por conta própria tem melhores condições 
para ser percebida como mais independente 
 A avaliação realizada por uma empresa que também presta serviços de mediação 
imobiliária tem menores condições para ser independente 
 A mudança obrigatória do avaliador contribui para uma maior independência nas 
avaliações 
 A existência de um relacionamento prévio entre o avaliador e o cliente contribui 
para uma menor independência dos avaliadores 
 Um cliente de maior dimensão exerce maior pressão sobre os avaliadores, podendo 
comprometer a independência dos mesmos 
 A dependência económica do avaliador/empresa de avaliação de um número 
reduzido de clientes pode contribuir para uma menor independência dos avaliadores 
 A forma de remuneração das avaliações pode contribuir para uma menor 
independência dos avaliadores 
 A existência de reuniões entre o cliente e o avaliador antes do relatório final pode 
contribuir para uma maior pressão do cliente sobre o avaliador 
 A existência de conflitos de interesse afetam negativamente a independência do 
avaliador 




 As pressões resultantes da crise financeira atual podem influenciar negativamente a 
independência do avaliador 
 O acesso a trabalhos anteriores pode influenciar as novas avaliações do mesmo 
imóvel diminuindo a independência do avaliador 
 A existência de sanções para os avaliadores poderá garantir o aumento da 
independência das avaliações 
 O tipo de formação académica do avaliador possibilita que este seja mais 
independente na sua avaliação 
 Os avaliadores ou empresas de avaliação ligados a uma associação profissional são 
percebidos como mais independentes 
 Os avaliadores de pequenas empresas resistem menos às eventuais pressões dos 
clientes 
 A avaliação de uma empresa com nome no mercado é mais credível do que a 
avaliação de uma empresa pouco conhecida no mercado 
 O tipo de cliente (sendo banco, fundo ou empresa) tem influência sobre a 
independência das avaliações 
 Atualmente existe uma grande concorrência de preços nas avaliações o que pode 
contribuir para uma menor independência da avaliação 
 A proposta da CMVM de valorização dos ativos dos fundos de investimento 
imobiliário através da média de duas avaliações realizadas por dois peritos 
avaliadores externos pode levar a um aumento da pressão do cliente sobre o 
avaliador 
 A existência de uma única associação de avaliadores em Portugal com força no 
mercado poderia contribuir para a maior independência dos avaliadores 
 O avaliador é influenciado pelo facto de saber que a avaliação tem como objetivo a 
compra ou a venda de um imóvel 
 A existência de standards ou normas internas contribui para uma maior 
independência do avaliador 
 A existência de vários tipos de relação (avaliação, mediação, consultoria, etc.) entre 
a empresa de avaliação (ou avaliador) e o cliente poderá comprometer a 
independência da avaliação 





Caso existam outros fatores que considera relevantes para a análise da independência de 
um avaliador e que não estão aqui referidos, por favor, indique os: 
 
3. Por favor, indique o grau de importância que os seguintes fatores podem ter na 
independência de um avaliador 
 Dimensão do cliente  
 Pressão da atual situação económica do país  
 Experiência do avaliador  
 Vontade de manter um determinado cliente em carteira  
 Objetivo da avaliação (ser para venda, compra ou para efeitos de avaliação do ativo 
de uma empresa) 
 Existir relacionamento prévio entre cliente e avaliador  
 Acesso a trabalhos anteriores do mesmo imóvel  
 Dependência económica do avaliador face ao cliente  
 Concorrência existente no mercado de avaliações imobiliárias  
 Existência de conflitos de interesse  
 Risco de o avaliador perder credibilidade no mercado  
 Duração da relação cliente/avaliador  
 Flexibilidade das normas de conduta  
 Dimensão do avaliador/empresa de avaliação  
 Integração numa empresa internacional de avaliações  
 Cultura e contexto no qual se insere a avaliação  
 Situação económica e financeira do cliente  
 Discussão prévia do relatório de avaliação com o cliente  
 Rotação frequente do avaliador  
 Forma de remuneração das avaliações  
 Risco de sanções disciplinares impostas por associações profissionais ou entidades 
reguladoras 
 Risco de litigância  




 Risco do avaliador perder a licença para exercer a sua atividade  
 Formação académica do avaliador  
 Tipo de cliente (banco, fundo de investimento imobiliário ou empresa) 
 
 
APPENDIX B  
Brief characterization of the interviewees 
Interviewees Job Function Type of Organization 
A Appraiser Appraisal 
B Appraiser Appraisal 
C Fund Manager Mediator and appraiser 
D Appraiser Mediator and appraiser 
E Fund Manager Mediator 









Output KMO and Bartlett's Test 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. 
,787 





   
APPENDIX D 
Mann-Whitney Test Non Parametric 
Test Statistics 
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de um 
relacionamento 
prévio entre o 



















Mann-Whitney U 152,000 74,000 179,000 170,000 171,000 136,000 150,500 153,000 
Wilcoxon W 257,000 399,000 530,000 521,000 276,000 487,000 501,500 504,000 
Z -,871 -3,059 -,088 -,354 -,330 -1,362 -,955 -,879 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,384 ,002 ,930 ,723 ,741 ,173 ,340 ,380 

















Exact Sig. (2-tailed) ,392 ,002 ,948 ,734 ,759 ,177 ,346 ,397 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) ,198 ,001 ,472 ,369 ,377 ,093 ,170 ,205 





















  A dependência 
económica do 
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153,000 165,500 180,500 131,500 175,000 165,000 167,500 159,000 
Wilcoxon 
W 
504,000 516,500 531,500 236,500 280,000 465,000 518,500 264,000 




























,397 ,615 ,974 ,126 ,841 ,927 ,684 ,516 
Exact Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
,205 ,311 ,487 ,063 ,422 ,466 ,347 ,252 
Point 
Probability 
,026 ,022 ,004 ,002 ,023 ,004 ,007 ,006 
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Mann-Whitney U 162,500 149,000 180,000 150,000 134,000 114,000 179,000 
Wilcoxon W 267,500 254,000 285,000 255,000 485,000 439,000 284,000 
Z -,589 -,991 -,059 -,760 -1,399 -1,845 -,090 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 


















Exact Sig. (2-tailed) ,578 ,331 ,959 ,481 ,175 ,064 ,943 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) ,288 ,168 ,478 ,233 ,090 ,034 ,481 
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  O avaliador 
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influenciado 
pelo facto de 




compra ou a 
venda de um 
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etc.) entre a 
empresa de 
avaliação (ou 






Mann-Whitney U 134,000 154,500 164,000 180,000 151,500 181,000 
Wilcoxon W 239,000 259,500 269,000 531,000 256,500 532,000 
Z -1,433 -,810 -,522 -,059 -,935 -,030 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 


















,154 ,436 ,610 ,965 ,355 ,985 
Exact Sig. (1-
tailed) 
,076 ,218 ,306 ,472 ,180 ,502 




Mann-Whitney Test Non Parametric 
Ranks 
Cargo que ocupa N Mean Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
  Um avaliador com mais anos de 
experiência profissional na área 
consegue resistir melhor a eventuais 
pressões 
avaliador 26 21,65 563,00 
gestor 14 18,36 257,00 
Total 40     
  A avaliação realizada por uma 
empresa integrada num grupo 
internacional de avaliação tem 
melhores condições para ser 
percebida como mais independente 
avaliador 25 15,96 399,00 
gestor 14 27,21 381,00 
Total 39     
  A avaliação realizada por uma 
empresa nacional de avaliação tem 
melhores condições para ser 
percebida como mais independente 
avaliador 26 20,38 530,00 
gestor 14 20,71 290,00 
Total 40     
  A avaliação realizada por um 
avaliador por conta própria tem 
melhores condições para ser 
percebida como mais independente 
avaliador 26 20,04 521,00 
gestor 14 21,36 299,00 
Total 40     




  A avaliação realizada por uma 
empresa que também presta serviços 
de mediação imobiliária tem menores 
condições para ser independente 
avaliador 26 20,92 544,00 
gestor 14 19,71 276,00 
Total 40     
  A mudança obrigatória do avaliador 
contribui para uma maior 
independência nas avaliações 
avaliador 26 18,73 487,00 
gestor 14 23,79 333,00 
Total 40     
  A existência de um relacionamento 
prévio entre o avaliador e o cliente 
contribui para uma menor 
independência dos avaliadores 
avaliador 26 19,29 501,50 
gestor 14 22,75 318,50 
Total 40     
  Um cliente de maior dimensão 
exerce maior pressão sobre os 
avaliadores, podendo comprometer a 
independência dos mesmos 
avaliador 26 19,38 504,00 
gestor 14 22,57 316,00 
Total 40     
  A dependência económica do 
avaliador/empresa de avaliação de um 
número reduzido de clientes pode 
contribuir para uma menor 
independência dos avaliadores 
avaliador 26 19,87 516,50 
gestor 14 21,68 303,50 
Total 40     
  A forma de remuneração das 
avaliações pode contribuir para uma 
menor independência dos avaliadores 
avaliador 26 20,44 531,50 
gestor 14 20,61 288,50 
Total 40     
  A existência de reuniões entre o 
cliente e o avaliador antes do relatório 
final pode contribuir para uma maior 
pressão do cliente sobre o avaliador 
avaliador 26 22,44 583,50 
gestor 14 16,89 236,50 
Total 40     
  A existência de conflitos de interesse 
afetam negativamente a 
independência do avaliador 
avaliador 26 20,77 540,00 
gestor 14 20,00 280,00 
Total 40     
  As pressões resultantes da crise 
financeira atual podem influenciar 
negativamente a independência do 
avaliador 
avaliador 24 19,38 465,00 
gestor 14 19,71 276,00 
Total 38     
  A predisposição do Banco para 
conceder crédito habitação, pode 
influenciar o trabalho do avaliador 
(credit boom vs. credit crunch) 
avaliador 26 19,94 518,50 
gestor 14 21,54 301,50 
Total 40     
  A existência de uma única avaliação 
do imóvel pode contribuir para uma 
menor independência do avaliador 
avaliador 26 21,38 556,00 
gestor 14 18,86 264,00 
Total 40     
  O acesso a  trabalhos anteriores 
pode influenciar as novas avaliações 
do mesmo imóvel diminuindo a 
independência do avaliador 
avaliador 26 21,25 552,50 
gestor 14 19,11 267,50 
Total 40     
  A existência de sanções  para os 
avaliadores poderá garantir o aumento 
da independência das avaliações 
avaliador 26 21,77 566,00 
gestor 14 18,14 254,00 
Total 40     
  O tipo de formação académica do 
avaliador possibilita que este seja 
mais independente na sua avaliação 
avaliador 26 20,58 535,00 
gestor 14 20,36 285,00 
Total 40     
  Os avaliadores ou empresas de 
avaliação ligados a uma associação 
profissional são percebidos como mais 
independentes 
avaliador 25 21,00 525,00 
gestor 14 18,21 255,00 
Total 39     
  Os avaliadores de pequenas avaliador 26 18,65 485,00 




empresas resistem menos às 
eventuais pressões dos clientes 
gestor 14 23,93 335,00 
Total 40     
  A avaliação de uma empresa com 
nome no mercado é mais credível do 
que a avaliação de uma empresa 
pouco conhecida no mercado 
avaliador 25 17,56 439,00 
gestor 14 24,36 341,00 
Total 39     
  O tipo de cliente (sendo banco, fundo 
ou empresa) tem influência sobre a 
independência das avaliações 
avaliador 26 20,62 536,00 
gestor 14 20,29 284,00 
Total 40     
  Atualmente existe uma grande 
concorrência de preços nas 
avaliações o que pode contribuir para 
uma menor independência da 
avaliação 
avaliador 26 22,35 581,00 
gestor 14 17,07 239,00 
Total 40     
  A proposta da CMVM de valorização 
dos activos dos fundos de 
investimento imobiliário através da 
média de duas avaliações realizadas 
por dois peritos avaliadores externos 
pode levar a um aumento da pressão 
do cliente sobre o avaliador 
avaliador 26 21,56 560,50 
gestor 14 18,54 259,50 
Total 40     
  A existência de uma única 
associação de avaliadores em 
Portugal com força no mercado 
poderia contribuir para a maior 
independência dos avaliadores 
avaliador 26 21,19 551,00 
gestor 14 19,21 269,00 
Total 40     
  O avaliador é influenciado pelo facto 
de saber que a avaliação tem como 
objetivo a compra ou a venda de um 
imóvel 
avaliador 26 20,42 531,00 
gestor 14 20,64 289,00 
Total 40     
  A existência de  standards ou 
normas internas contribui para uma 
maior independência do avaliador 
avaliador 26 21,67 563,50 
gestor 14 18,32 256,50 
Total 40     
  A existência de vários tipos de 
relação (avaliação, mediação, 
consultoria, etc.) entre a empresa de 
avaliação (ou avaliador) e o cliente 
poderá comprometer a independência 
da avaliação 
avaliador 26 20,46 532,00 
gestor 14 20,57 288,00 
Total 40     
 
 
